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Abstract 
Although Sweden was not as directly impacted by the Global Financial Crisis as some other 
economies, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, prompted Swedish authorities to 
take preemptive measures to protect domestic banks and financial institutions. One such program, 
announced on October 20, 2008, and implemented on October 29, 2008, was designed to preserve 
credit extension to businesses and households through what became known as the Swedish 
Guarantee Scheme. Per the terms of the Scheme, new short- and medium-term debt of maturities 
ranging from 90 days to five years issued by eligible banks would be guaranteed by the Swedish 
government in exchange for a fee based on the maturity of the guaranteed debt and the risk profile 
of the issuing institution. The Scheme would be funded by a more general stabilization fund and 
initially capped at a maximum of SEK 1500 billion ($195.1 billion). Peak utilization reached SEK 354 
billion in 2009. None of the six participating institutions experienced defaults. The issuance window 
for the program expired on June 30, 2011, and all outstanding debt had matured by May 13, 2015.  
Keywords: Sweden, medium-term debt, government guarantee  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
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At a Glance  
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 roiled global financial 
markets and threatened to interrupt the flow of 
credit even in countries far removed from the 
subprime mortgage market, such as Sweden. 
Swedish authorities feared that this turbulence 
in financial markets would have negative 
effects on the real economy by impeding the 
flow of credit to households and businesses. In 
order to keep credit flowing, the Swedish 
Guarantee Scheme (“the Guarantee Scheme”) 
was established in October 2008 by the 
Swedish Government, based on emergency 
legislation passed by the parliament. The 
Scheme granted the Swedish National Debt 
Office (SNDO) a mandate to guarantee up to 
SEK 1500 billion ($195.1 billion) of short- and 
medium-term debt securities with maturities 
ranging from 90 days to five years issued by 
eligible institutions. This guarantee would be 
provided in exchange for a fee based on the 
maturity of the guaranteed debt and the risk 
profile of the issuing institution.  
The Guarantee Scheme reached peak 
utilization of SEK 354 billion in the middle of 
2009, with guaranteed issuances trailing off 
over the following year. 
Summary Evaluation 
The Swedish Guarantee Scheme is seen as having been successful in fulfilling its purpose of ensuring 
the continued extension of credit in Sweden. The Guarantee Scheme was especially useful for 
Swedbank AB, which was one of the largest Swedish banks in the country and had at one point issued 
90 percent of outstanding guaranteed bonds. The program returned surplus participation payments 
of SEK 6 billion to the stabilization fund.  
 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To preserve credit extension to Swedish 
households and businesses by allowing banks and 
credit institutions to issue debt securities with 
government guarantees and thereby meet their 
short- and medium-term funding needs  
Announcement Date  October 20, 2008 
Operational Date October 29, 2008 





Originally April 30, 
2009, later extended to 
June 30, 2011 
Program Size Originally SEK 1500 
billion ($195.1 billion), 
later reduced to SEK 
750 billion 
Usage  SEK 354 billion by six 
Swedish financial 
institutions at peak  
Outcomes No defaults; SEK 6 
billion in fees generated 
Notable Features Certain restrictions 
(capital requirements 
and caps on growth for 
participating firms) 
relaxed over time to 
encourage participation 
The Swedish Guarantee Scheme 
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Swedish Guarantee Scheme:  Sweden Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal 
GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$492.5 billion equivalent in 2007 
$523.9 billion equivalent in 2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal 
GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$53,700 equivalent per capita in 2007 



















Size of banking 
system 
$569.2 billion in total assets in 2007 
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Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
115.6% in 2007 
125.1% in 2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of 
financial system 
No data available for 2007/2008 
 





98.5% of total banking assets in 2007 
98.5% of total banking assets in 2008 
 





0% of total banking assets in 2007 
0% of total banking assets in 2008 
 





0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 




100% insurance on deposits up to $36,818 
 
Source: Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and 








In the fall of 2008, turbulence in global financial markets caused by difficulties in the U.S. housing 
market began to threaten financial stability in Sweden. Although Swedish firms had largely avoided 
exposure to subprime mortgage-backed securities that had contributed to the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, they were nonetheless impacted by the ensuing credit crunch.  
The Swedish authorities feared that the turbulence in financial markets would affect the Swedish real 
economy if banks’ inability to meet their short- and medium-term funding needs were to negatively 
affect the aggregate amount of credit extended to firms and households. Based on legislation brought 
through the parliament under emergency procedures, the Government was granted far-reaching 
powers to deal with the crisis and its consequences for the Swedish financial sector.  
Program Description 
In response to the reduction in the availability of credit, the Government introduced on October 20, 
2008, the Government Guarantees to Banks and Others Ordinance (2008:819) under the purview of 
the Government Support to Credit Institutions Act (2008:814). The Ordinance gave the power to 
issue guarantees to the Swedish National Debt Office (SNDO), which in turn issued the SNDO 
Regulations (2008:1 and 2008:2).4 
In order to increase the supply of lending to homes and businesses, the Swedish Guarantee Scheme 
(“the Guarantee Scheme”) allowed qualifying institutions to issue certain debt instruments with a 
government guarantee. This allowed banks and credit institutions to meet their short and medium-
term funding requirements. The Guarantee Scheme, like other Swedish interventions, would be 
funded by a new government-backed stabilization fund introduced in the Act. Reserves drawn from 
the fund would be repaid using interest and fee payments accrued in association with the 
interventions. 
Effective October 29, 2008, the Guarantee Scheme was initially designed to allow issuances until April 
30, 2009. The SNDO, with the approval of the European Commission and in accordance with EU State 
aid rules, amended the program several times to ultimately extend its issuance window through June 
30, 2011. The government’s guarantee commitments were initially capped in the Ordinance decided 
 
4 The Swedish National Debt Office can be thought of as a combined equivalent of the FDIC and Treasury. It was 
established by King Gustav III in 1789 to finance the War against Russia. Today, it operates under the Swedish 
Ministry of Finance and Government. According to its website, the SNDO’s main responsibilities include: 
“-providing banking services for the central government 
-raising loans and managing central government debt 
-providing state guarantees and loans 
-being responsible for the deposit insurance and investor protection schemes 
-managing government support for banks” (“The Debt Office”).  
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by the Government at SEK 1500 billion ($195.05 billion)5, of which a maximum of SEK 500 billion 
could apply to covered bonds with maturities between three and five years. Sweden subsequently 
reduced these amounts to SEK 750 billion and SEK 250 billion in connection with an extension of the 
Guarantee Scheme into 2011. In addition, there were limits placed on the amount that could be 
guaranteed at any single institution determined by the total amount of maturing debt securities and 
the level of public deposits held by the institution in September 2008.  
The Guarantee Scheme was designed to assist banks and credit institutions incorporated and 
operating in Sweden (including Swedish subsidiaries of foreign establishments), as these institutions 
were most likely to provide credit to Swedish households and firms (European Commission 2010). 
Select lenders targeting local government organizations were also included. Additionally, because 
there were no currency restrictions imposed, debt denominated in currencies other than SEK was 
eligible. To qualify for a State guarantee under the program, banks and lending institutions had to 
meet strict capital adequacy requirements in order to prove their solvency (European Commission 
2008). The original terms of the Guarantee Scheme required Tier 1 capital of at least 6 percent and 
combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital reserves of at least 9 percent. These regulations were loosened 
somewhat in an April 2009 amendment to the initial terms to require only the minimum capital 
reserve requirement of 8 percent (European Commission 2008).  
The Guarantee Scheme applied to short- and medium-term debt (including senior and covered bonds, 
certificates of deposits, and other debt securities not subordinated) with maturities between 90 days 
and three years, or maturities between 90 days and five years in the case of covered bonds. In April 
2009 Swedish authorities amended the Guarantee Scheme to enable non-collateralized debt with 
maturities over three years to be eligible as well. Only debt issued after an express approval by the 
SNDO was eligible to be guaranteed under the Scheme. In addition, complex structured products, 
such as index share bonds and guaranteed equity bonds, or instruments that qualified as either Tier 
1 or Tier 2 capital, were not eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme (European 
Commission 2008). 
In exchange for a participation fee that varied based on an individual institution’s specific risk 
(assessed using market data from before the crisis; see Key Design Decision 11) and the maturity of 
the debt to be issued, guaranteed securities received triple-A ratings from the major rating agencies 
based on the rating of the Kingdom of Sweden. They were also treated as government bonds by the 
Riksbank lending facilities. In the event that an issuer participating in the Guarantee Scheme failed 
to pay amounts due to its lenders, the government could be “called upon within three days if nothing 
else is agreed” (Grunnesjö and Wallenborg 2009).  
The conditions for acceptance into the Guarantee Scheme included limits on the compensation of the 
five highest-paid employees at any firm seeking admission. These terms eliminated bonuses and 
stock options payable to senior officers and limited the fixed pay and severance packages that they 
could receive. Restrictions were also placed on compensation for Board members at guaranteed 
institutions (European Commission 2008).  
 
5 In October 2008, $1.00 = approximately SEK 7.69.  
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In addition to the limitations on senior officer and Board compensation, participating firms faced 
prohibitions and restrictions aimed at reducing the potential for profiting excessively as a result of 
the Guarantee Scheme. Moreover, participation in the Scheme could not be used in the marketing of 
the firm. Furthermore, as specified in the original terms of the Scheme, institutions were prohibited 
from expanding their operations beyond the pace which would have been possible prior to receiving 
government support. 
This last condition for participation was retracted in an amendment on January 29, 2009, as 
institutions were reluctant to participate in the Scheme given the restrictions (European Commission 
2009). 
Outcomes 
Over the course of its implementation, six Swedish financial institutions6 issued debt under the 
guarantee program. Peak utilization reached SEK 354 billion of debt issued in mid-2009. Over 75 
percent of the guarantees were issued in foreign currencies, primarily in U.S. dollars and euros 
(European Commission 2010).  
After June 30, 2011, no additional debt issuance was guaranteed under the Guarantee Scheme. By 
design, outstanding guaranteed debt had maturities extending past the end of the Scheme. The SNDO 
was never required to fulfill obligations on any of the guaranteed debt, all of which had matured by 
May 13, 2015. All in all, the SNDO recorded a SEK 6 million surplus from participation fees (“Swedish 
guarantee programme for banks concluded”).  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1.  The Guarantee Scheme was implemented as part of a package of stabilization measures 
taken by the Swedish authorities during the Global Financial Crisis.  
The dual purpose of these measures was to restore confidence and encourage healthy interbank 
lending through the provision of liquidity (European Commission 2008). Included in the series of 
new programs were a new deposit guarantee program that had a higher maximum ceiling and 
covered all deposits, a recapitalization scheme in which the Swedish government could inject capital 
if a new capital investment was at least 30% private capital, and a state-backed stabilization fund to 
finance the interventions.  
2. Following emergency legislation by the parliament, the Guarantee Scheme was authorized 
by the Kingdom of Sweden under Ordinances (2008:814) and (2008:819) on State 
Guarantees for Banks and further specified in the Swedish National Debt Office’s 
Regulations (2008:1) and (2008:2) concerning State Guarantees for Banks. 
These measures formed the legal basis for the Guarantee Scheme.  
 
6 Swedbank AB; Swedbank Hypotek AB; Sveriges Bostadsfinansieringsaktiebolag, SBAB; Volvofinans Bank AB; 
Carnegie Investment Bank AB; and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB. 
917
Swedish Guarantee Scheme Engbith and Kiernan
 
3. The Guarantee Scheme was also approved for implementation by the European 
Commission in accordance with State aid rules. 
As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantee Scheme in such a way as to 
ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features. 
4. Initially, up to SEK 1500 billion could be guaranteed under the program. 
Swedish authorities subsequently reduced this amount to SEK 750 billion in connection with 
extending the Guarantee Scheme into 2011, given a desire to gradually phase out support to promote 
institutions’ return to market financing. 
5. The Guarantee Scheme was to be funded out of a stabilization fund established by Swedish 
authorities to fund interventions to support the banking system.   
With the implementation of measures to support the Swedish banking sector in October of 2008, 
Swedish authorities established a stabilization fund to finance the program of government 
interventions, including any calls to honor guarantees under the Guarantee Scheme. Any support 
recovered from support measures would be paid back into the fund. In addition, banks and other 
credit institutions would be required to pay an annual stabilization fee to the fund which would be 
an amount proportional to the size of the institution’s balance sheet. The stabilization fund was 
seeded with an initial government appropriation of SEK 15 billion and was intended to amount to 
about 2.5 percent of GDP. 
6.  Eligibility for the Scheme was restricted to Swedish banks and credit institutions, as well 
as select lenders who provided credit to local governments, which met certain 
capitalization and solvency requirements.  
The goal of the Guarantee Scheme was to ensure the continued extension of credit to Swedish 
households and businesses, as well as to municipal governments. Therefore, to be eligible to 
participate in the Scheme, an institution had to either be incorporated in Sweden or a Swedish 
subsidiary of a foreign institution. In addition, firms had to demonstrate that they engaged in 
considerable lending on the Swedish Market (Riksgälden 2010).  
In addition to being Swedish institutions active in lending to businesses and households, 
participating firms were required by the Swedish National Debt Office to meet certain capital 
requirements. The first version of the terms, passed in October 2008, called for a capital requirement 
of 6 percent Tier 1 capital and 9 percent combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. This condition was 
relaxed in an amendment dated April 28, 2009, to the law, resulting in a requirement of only 8 percent 
combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.  
7.  New short- and medium-term debt, including senior and covered bonds, certificates of 
deposits, and other unsubordinated debt securities were eligible for guarantees.  
Coverage under the Guarantee Scheme applied only to new debt issued after the issuing institution 
had been approved for participation in the program by the SNDO. 
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Additionally, subordinated bonds, complex structured products—such as index share bonds and 
guaranteed equity bonds—or instruments that qualified as either Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital, were not 
eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme (European Commission 2008). 
In seeking and obtaining approval from the European Commission for the inclusion of covered bonds, 
Swedish authorities specifically cited the example of Denmark, where the non-inclusion of covered 
debt in a guarantee program was seen as resulting in the drying up of that market. With over 80% of 
Swedish housing loans packaged into covered bonds, Swedish authorities argued that the continued 
functioning of the covered bond market was essential to Sweden’s financial system as a whole. To 
limit the potential for distortion resulting from longer guarantees for covered bonds, Swedish 
authorities agreed to restrict the amount of the guarantee available for covered bonds with 
maturities of three years to five years to one-third the overall total, or SEK 500 billion (later reduced 
to SEK 250 billion with the reduction in the overall Guarantee Scheme from SEK 1500 billion to SEK 
750 billion) (European Commission 2008). 
Swedish authorities designated debt guaranteed under the Guarantee Scheme as eligible collateral 
for Riksbank liquidity facilities.  
8. Initially, debt ranging in maturity from 90 days to three years could be issued under the 
Guarantee Scheme (five years in the case of covered bonds). 
Since the Scheme was designed to help firms meet their short- and medium-term funding needs, all 
instruments covered under the Guarantee Scheme were of maturities between 90 days and five years. 
As such, it was a complement to extraordinary liquidity support measures introduced by the 
Riksbank. These measures initially had a maximum maturity of 90 days but were subsequently 
extended to one year. Initially, most debt instruments covered under the guarantee were required to 
have maturities between 90 days and three years; only covered bonds were permitted to have 
maturities extending out to five years. An April 2009 amendment to the Guarantee Scheme enabled 
even uncollateralized debt to have maturities greater than three years. Debt with maturities greater 
than three years was limited to one-third of the overall Guarantee Scheme amount.  
9.  All currencies were eligible. 
As a practical matter, because most maturing debt was denominated in U.S. dollars and euros, these 
are the currencies that ended up being heavily represented among guaranteed debt.  
10.  The Swedish government imposed caps on individual firms’ eligibility based on maturing 
debts and public deposits.  
For each financial institution, individual guarantee caps were determined and imposed according to 
the maximum of either:  
1. The sum of that institution’s debt instruments maturing after September 1, 2008, but prior 
to April 30, 2009, and which had maturities longer than 90 days; OR  
2. 20 percent of that institution’s public deposits as of September 1, 2008 (European 
Commission 2008).  
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The second option was added to avoid distortions between banks that had been issuing securities 
and those that relied solely on deposit funding. 
A January 2009 amendment to the Guarantee Scheme enabled these calculations to be performed at 
the group level. The overall amount of guaranteed debt would remain the same as if the calculations 
had been performed at the level of individual institutions, but groups would have greater flexibility 
in how their allocations were distributed among the members of the groups. 
11. The fee for issuing debt pursuant to the Guarantee Scheme varied based on the soundness 
of the issuing institution and the maturity of the debt guaranteed.  
The “Recommendations on Government Guarantees on Bank Debt,” set forth on October 20, 2008, by 
the European Central Bank, provided guidance on the approach to fees to be adopted by European 
countries introducing bank debt guarantees. Sweden’s fees were consistent with this guidance. 
Fees for individual institutions were assessed according to a measure of the institution’s specific risk, 
plus an additional fixed amount of 50 basis points.  
a) “For credit guarantees on bank debt with maturities of less than or equal to 1 year, the fee 
would be equal to 0.5% on an annual basis. In these cases, an assessment of the institution’s 
risk would not be taken into account.  
b) For Credit guarantees with maturity longer than 1 year:  
• For banks with CDS data, the price should equal the median 5-year CDS spread over the 
period 1 January 2007 to 31 August 2008 (the first criterion), plus 0.5% on an annual 
basis (the second criterion).  
• For banks without CDS data, or representative CDS data, but with a credit rating, an 
equivalent CDS spread should be derived from the median value of 5-year CDS spreads 
during the above mentioned period for the rating category of the banks concerned, based 
on a representative sample of euro area large banks (the second criterion remains 
unchanged).  
• For banks without CDS data and without a credit rating, an equivalent CDS spread should 
be derived from the median value of 5-year CDS spreads over the same period for the 
lowest rating category (the second criterion remains unchanged).  
• For guarantees for covered bonds the second criterion, the add-on fee will be set to 0.25 
% on an annual basis (the first criterion remains unchanged).” 
This pricing structure would remain constant until April 30, 2009, but could be altered in the event 
that the SNDO granted an extension of the Guarantee Scheme (European Commission 2008). Per a 
June 2010 amendment to the Guarantee Scheme, fees were increased by 20bps to 40bps consistent 
with guidance from the European Commission on guarantee programs being extended beyond June 
30, 2010. The purpose of this fee increase was to better reflect market conditions and to encourage 
participants to shift to non-guaranteed issuance as conditions allowed.  
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12.  Initially the SNDO set limits on growth for institutions participating in the Guarantee 
Scheme, but this condition was ultimately repealed.  
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit guarantee 
programs called for the inclusion in programs of a set of safeguards “to minimize…distortions and 
the potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries brought about by a State guarantee” 
and “to avoid moral hazard.” This guidance did not specify exactly what safeguards a program should 
include but required “an adequate combination” of elements including restrictions on advertising 
based on the guarantee, balance sheet growth, share buybacks, and executive compensation some of 
which Sweden adopted. 
As specified in the original terms of the Scheme, institutions were prohibited from expanding their 
operations beyond the pace which would have been possible prior to receiving government support. 
This was calculated by Swedish authorities as being the highest of: 
a) The annual growth rate of Swedish nominal GDP in the previous year;  
b) The average historical balance sheet growth in the Swedish banking sector from 1987 to 
2007; 
c) The average balance sheet growth in the EU banking sector in the prior six months (European 
Commission 2008).  
Additionally, participation in the Scheme could not be used in the marketing of the firm.  
The restriction on balance sheet growth was retracted in an amendment dated January 29, 2009, as 
institutions were reluctant to participate in the Scheme given the restrictions (European Commission 
2009). 
13.  Limits on executive and Board compensation were conditions for participation in the 
Guarantee Scheme. 
The Swedish Guarantee Scheme required participating firms to restrict both salary and bonus pay to 
the five highest-paid executives of the firm. The fixed salary pay of these individuals could not exceed 
the level determined prior to the announcement of the Scheme on October 20th, 2008. Variable bonus 
pay was entirely prohibited for the top five officers at participating firms. In addition, severance 
packages could not exceed the amounts prescribed for senior officers of government organizations, 
and board members at participating institutions could not be compensated above the levels decided 
prior to the announcement of the Scheme (European Commission 2008). 
14.  Although the issuance window of the Guarantee Scheme was initially set for six months, it 
was extended multiple times and ultimately lasted until June 30, 2011.  
At first the Scheme’s issuance window was designed to be short-lived, lasting only until April 30, 
2009, with the option of an extension through December 31, 2009. Through a series of amendments 
and extensions announced by the SNDO and approved by the European Commission in accordance 
with the EU State aid rules, the duration of the Scheme was extended multiple times to run through 
June 30, 2011. Although by 2010 and 2011 Sweden noted improvements in its institutions’ ability to 
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secure funding without the benefit of the guarantee, the emerging sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
resulted in continued uncertainties. Swedish authorities viewed the extension of the Guarantee 
Scheme as a “stand-by insurance policy that could give banks access to medium-term financing, if 
conditions were to deteriorate” (European Commission 2010). 
III. Evaluation 
It is difficult to isolate the effects of the Guarantee Scheme from those of other interventions 
implemented by the Swedish authorities around the end of 2008, in particular the Riksbank’s 
extraordinary liquidity support measures. Still, while the Swedish Guarantee Scheme was not as 
widely used as permitted, SNDO officials viewed it as having successfully fulfilled its purpose of 
ensuring the extension of credit to Swedish households and businesses (“Swedish guarantee 
programme for banks concluded”). More generally, analysts have credited the Swedish authorities 
preemptive and proactively aggressive use of monetary policy for quickly alleviating the effects of 
the financial crisis (Irwin 2011).  
The Guarantee Scheme was of immense importance to Swedbank AB, which was one of the four 
largest banks in the country and at one point issued 90 percent of outstanding guaranteed debt 
securities.  
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